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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement 
And Taxpayer Compliance
by Adam Thimmesch, David Gamage, and Darien Shanske
This article is the second in a series arguing 
for a modified approach to the state use tax — 
one in which states focus greater compliance 
efforts on consumers and their individual use 
tax obligations. Our prior article addressed the 
economic and rule-of-law considerations that 
support that approach.1 That article showed (1) 
that states will leave a significant amount of tax 
revenue uncollected if they focus their 
enforcement efforts primarily on vendors, and 
(2) that states’ current enforcement postures
threaten to undermine the reciprocal
relationship between the governing and the
governed that is the basis for our system of
laws. This article continues the latter theme and
focuses on that reciprocal relationship from a
compliance angle.
Tax compliance is a function of many factors 
— from existing penalties and enforcement 
mechanisms to subjective feelings of fairness 
and internalized norms of conduct. The state 
use tax is not immune from those factors, nor 
are the effects of the use tax system confined to 
use tax compliance. This article explores those 
effects by discussing existing research on tax 
compliance and evaluating how inadequate 
enforcement of use taxes against consumers can 
undermine well-recognized motivators of tax 
compliance.
We will also explain in this article why the 
move by some states to adopt use tax notice and 
reporting statutes is strengthening the case for 
greater consumer-based use tax enforcement 
efforts. Those statutes offer state governments 
new tools for improving consumer-based use 
tax compliance. It is crucial for the state 
governments that adopt those statutes to use 
those tools. Failure to do so could undermine 
the rule of law, generate adverse economic and 
distributional effects, and threaten general tax 
morale and tax compliance.
Adam Thimmesch is 
a professor at the 
University of Nebraska 
College of Law; David 
Gamage is a professor 
of law at Indiana 
University’s Maurer 
School of Law; and 
Darien Shanske is a 
professor at the 
University of California 
Davis School of Law 
(King Hall).
In this edition of 
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors 
present part 2 of their argument regarding 
consumer-based use tax enforcement by 
addressing issues such as the psychology 
around taxpayer compliance and taxpayer 
privacy concerns.
1
Adam Thimmesch, David Gamage, and Darien Shanske, “The 
Case for Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement,” State Tax Notes, 
Sept. 11, 2017, p. 1049.
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Enforcement, Psychology, and Tax Compliance
States’ current focus on getting vendors to 
collect their use taxes is sensible as an 
administrative matter, but generates the 
economic and rule-of-law problems discussed 
in our prior article. Moreover, as we will explain 
in this article, inadequate consumer-based 
enforcement has the potential to erode 
taxpayers’ motivations to comply with their tax 
obligations more generally. The relationship 
between use tax nonenforcement and tax 
compliance is complicated, but both academic 
research and real-world evidence suggest that 
an important link exists.
To begin the analysis, it is well established 
that many factors go into individuals’ decisions 
of whether to comply with the law.2 A familiar 
model of compliance is the cost-benefit (or 
deterrence) model under which taxpayers 
weigh the benefits of evading tax against the 
costs of evading. That requires an assessment of 
the likelihood that evasion would be caught and 
the penalties that would be imposed if it were. 
That model predicts that taxpayers will choose 
to comply if the expected value of 
noncompliance is negative after making that 
calculation. Conversely, taxpayers will choose 
noncompliance if that expected value is 
positive.3
The deterrence model provides substantial 
insight into why people comply with tax laws, 
but most scholars agree that the deterrence 
model does not tell the entire story. Scholars 
have generally concluded that compliance is 
also a function of factors that may not show up 
in a traditional cost-benefit analysis, at least to 
some extent. Those factors include 
psychological influences, including one’s view 
of the legitimacy of the government’s authority.4
Determining the Legitimacy of the 
Government’s Authority
Many factors appear to impact individuals’ 
determinations regarding the legitimacy of the 
government’s authority. One such factor is the 
perceived trustworthiness of the government 
making the particular command. In assessing 
that, people may consider whether the 
government acts with the right motivations and 
whether government officials perform their 
duties competently.5 People may also consider 
whether the government enforces the law against 
those who do not comply.6 Coercion of that sort is 
important because it signals competency and 
protects complying taxpayers from feeling like 
“suckers” while others free ride.7
Another factor that appears to impact 
individuals’ legitimacy determinations is the 
fairness of the processes used by the government, 
or at least the individuals’ perception of that 
fairness.8 The concept of procedural justice 
recognizes that people want to be treated 
neutrally, honestly, consistently, politely, and 
respectfully.9 Research suggests that perceptions 
of fairness in government processes are even 
2
The literature on compliance is voluminous. See generally 
Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The Use Tax 
Experiment,” 2015 Utah L. R. 1083, 1088–1105 (2015).
3
Leandra Lederman, “The Interplay Between Norms and 
Enforcement in Tax Compliance,” 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1463–1466 
(2003).
4
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law at 25–27 
(Princeton University Press 2006); Margaret Levi et al., 
“Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs,” 53 
Am. Behav. Scientist 354, 354–56 (2009) (hereinafter Levi, 
Conceptualizing Legitimacy). See generally Levi et al., “The Reasons 
for Compliance with the Law,” in Understanding Social Action, 
Promoting Human Rights ch. 4 (2012) (hereinafter Levi, Reasons for 
Compliance). We alluded to this issue in our earlier article when 
we discussed how states’ current postures regarding use tax 
enforcement are inconsistent with general rule-of-law 
considerations and the reciprocal relationship that exists between 
the government and the governed. Thimmesch, Gamage, and 
Shanske, supra note 1, at 1053.
5
Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 356.
6
Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73; Levi and 
Audrey Sacks, A Comparative Series of National Public Attitude 
Surveys on Democracy, Markets, and Civil Society in Africa at 12, 
15-16 (Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 74, 2007), available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/working_papers/
AfropaperNo74.pdf.
7
Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73.
8
Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 356; Paul 
Mason, Steven Utke, and Brian M. Williams, “Why Pay Our Fair 
Share? How Perceived Influence Over Laws Affects Tax Evasion,” 
at 24–25; and Tyler, supra note 4, at 175.
9
Id.
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more important than their outcomes when it 
comes to predicting future compliance.10 For 
example, having a procedurally fair audit may be 
more important to a taxpayer than winning that 
audit, at least when it comes to deciding whether 
to report accurately in the future.11 Americans 
might dislike paying tax, but they seem to really 
dislike feeling that they have been treated unfairly 
by the government.
The Use Tax and the Legitimacy of 
State Government
The research discussed above suggests that 
many states’ current approaches to use tax 
enforcement are problematic. As we discussed in 
our prior article, states instruct residents to pay 
their use taxes and threaten sanctions for 
noncompliance. But many states then take only 
limited actions to follow through and actually 
enforce the tax against individual consumers. 
That incongruity not only creates rule-of-law 
issues, but could also be perceived as the 
government being dishonest or incompetent. 
Neither is good, and neither promotes trust in 
government. The limited enforcement of use taxes 
also results in a procedurally unjust 
administration of the tax laws. It results in the use 
tax functioning as an effective tax on honesty that 
treats the honest as suckers.12 That is the result of 
administrative choice, not legislative judgment, 
and it can have a negative impact on voluntary 
compliance for the reasons noted above.13
Inadequately enforcing use taxes against 
individual consumers could also create unfair 
distributional results. To begin to understand 
why, consider that many taxpayers appear to be 
unaware of the use tax or erroneously have come 
to believe that major categories of purchases — 
such as all e-commerce purchases — are tax 
exempt. Those taxpayers then evade the use tax 
unknowingly. Because state governments take 
limited enforcement actions against individuals, 
most of those taxpayers never learn that they have 
inadvertently been committing tax evasion.
By contrast, another group of taxpayers comes 
to learn about the use tax, perhaps from their tax 
return preparers or because they have tax-aware 
social networks. From those same sources, those 
taxpayers may also learn about the limited 
enforcement of the use tax. Some of those 
taxpayers will then choose to comply with their 
use tax obligations, potentially making them feel 
like suckers while also generating unfair 
distributional results for them. Other taxpayers 
may decide to commit tax evasion, based on the 
low probability of that tax evasion being 
detected.
Yet another group of taxpayers may learn 
about the use tax — perhaps from the instructions 
on state tax returns or from other government 
sources — but without learning about its limited 
enforcement. Remember that states’ guidance 
suggests that reporting use tax is every bit as 
important as reporting wage income, so a 
taxpayer looking for guidance from the state will 
be uninformed about the limited enforcement of 
the use tax.14
As another example of how a taxpayer might 
come to learn about the use tax, but not about its 
limited enforcement, one of us (Thimmesch) has 
participated in training for the Volunteer Income 
Tax Assistance program in which state 
representatives stressed the importance of 
informing clients about their use tax obligations 
and asking them about their online purchases. 
While that approach is certainly correct as a 
matter of law, it has the potential to create adverse 
distributional consequences. Absent greater 
efforts to increase use tax compliance more 
generally, it is problematic to focus compliance 
efforts on those who are among the least well-off.15 
State sales and use taxes are already regressive. 
10
This work has been extended specifically to tax compliance 
with generally positive results. See Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 
1099–1101.
11
Eric Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior at 84-85 
(2007).
12
Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73.
13
See also Brian T. Camp, “The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of 
Taxing Virtual Worlds,” 59 Hastings L.J. 1, 23 (2007) (noting that 
voluntary compliance suffers when the government “makes 
suckers out of compliant taxpayers by imposing requirements that 
are practically unenforceable against noncompliant taxpayers”).
14
Taxpayers can also get this message more actively from the 
states. At least one state confronts taxpayers with a pop-up 
addressing use tax if they download their tax return from the 
state’s website. 2016 Michigan Individual Income Tax Return MI-
1040, Michigan Department of Treasury (Rev. 06-16).
15
To qualify for assistance, a taxpayer must generally make less 
than $54,000, have a disability, or have limited ability to speak 
English. See Internal Revenue Service, Free Return Preparation for 
Qualifying Taxpayers.
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Encouraging use tax compliance in a manner that 
disproportionately affects the least well-off would 
unjustly magnify that impact.
Some of those concerns might appear 
overblown simply because most consumers seem 
to be unaware of their use tax obligations.16 A 
consumer unaware of the tax would be hard-
pressed to react negatively to its nonenforcement. 
However, to the extent that is so, it is equally true 
that those considerations will become even more 
critical for states to consider as they take efforts to 
increase consumer awareness of the tax. This 
discussion thus suggests that states should 
combine efforts to increase consumer knowledge 
of the use tax with efforts to better enforce that tax 
against those who do not comply. Failing to do so 
has the potential to backfire by raising awareness 
of a taxing authority that does not have the ability 
to enforce the laws on the books.
About Use Tax Notice and Reporting Statutes
At the cutting edge of efforts to increase sales 
and use tax compliance are use tax notice and 
reporting statutes. Under those statutes, vendors 
that do not collect sales and use taxes are required 
to instead provide notice and information reports 
to both consumers and the state.17 Colorado was 
the first to adopt that method, and others have 
followed suit.18 The Multistate Tax Commission is 
also working on a model statute structured like 
the Colorado law.19
That approach generally involves the 
imposition of three different requirements on 
vendors that do not collect a state’s use tax. First, 
those vendors must inform consumers about their 
use tax obligations at the point of sale. Second, the 
vendors must mail their customers an annual 
summary of their purchasing activity. Third, the 
vendors must provide a summary of that activity 
to the state.20
Those notice and reporting statutes seem to be 
focused on promoting individual use tax 
compliance and are thus responsive to the 
concerns we have raised. As a general matter, we 
support state efforts to adopt those statutes, 
partially for the reasons we articulate in this series 
of articles.
However, raising awareness of the use tax is 
only part of the story. As we have emphasized, 
increased awareness ought to be tied to increased 
enforcement. We are thus concerned about 
whether Colorado and the other states 
considering use tax notice and reporting 
approaches are planning to make use of those 
new tools to improve their consumer-focused 
enforcement efforts.
Especially worrisome to us is the possibility 
that some state governments may be interested in 
those tools only as cudgels for encouraging 
remote vendors to switch to collecting sales and 
use taxes, and that some states therefore might not 
intend to use the information provided by those 
new statutes to improve consumer-based 
enforcement efforts. Such an approach might 
seem sensible if one starts from the assumption 
that only vendor-based collection of the use tax 
matters. Yet, as we have explained in this article 
and in our prior article, that perspective is 
incorrect. A significant use tax collection gap 
would likely remain even with the passage of 
something like the Marketplace Fairness Act, and 
suppressing the mainsprings of tax compliance 
could have untoward effects more broadly.
State governments can at least justify their 
limited consumer-based enforcement of use taxes 
on the grounds of administrative difficulty. We 
argue that those grounds do not justify current 
enforcement practices and that state governments 
should take further measures to enforce use taxes 
against consumers even in the absence of 
adopting use tax notice and reporting statutes. 
But for the states that adopt notice and reporting 
statutes, the excuse of administrative difficulty 
16
Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 1116 n.216.
17
Those requirements are particularly attractive because they 
manage to avoid the physical presence requirement of Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota (504 U.S. 298 (1992)). Direct Marketing Association v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1146 (2016).
18
See La. Leg., H.B. 1121 (2016 Reg. Sess.); Vt. Gen. Ass., H.B. 
873, section 26 (2015-2016 Sess.); Vt. Gen. Ass., H.B. 516, section 23 
(2016-2017 Sess.); and Wash. Leg., H.B. 2163, section 205 (2017 2d 
Spec. Sess.). For prior work considering the implications of 
Colorado’s efforts, see Gamage and Shanske, “The Implications of 
CSX and DMA,” State Tax Notes, May 11, 2015, p. 445; Gamage and 
Devin Heckman, “A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 523-25 (2012); and Gamage and 
Shanske, “The Saga of State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on the 
Colorado Decision,” State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197.
19
See Multistate Tax Commission, “Use Tax Information 
Working Group.”
20
Id.
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rings more hollow, as those states will in fact be 
receiving much of the information they need to 
enforce the tax. In addition, those statutes, by 
design, will make the use tax more visible and 
thus the lack of enforcement more obvious. Thus, 
for those states, continuing to inadequately 
enforce use taxes against consumers would more 
clearly and dramatically undermine the rule of 
law and threaten general tax morale and 
compliance.
Moreover, there is an additional challenge 
posed by notice and reporting statutes that ought 
to be taken into account in considering 
compliance: Those statutes potentially create 
privacy concerns. The regular collection of 
purchasing data is a significant increase in a state 
government’s surveillance of taxpayers’ everyday 
activities, and states should be aware that this 
could have negative effects on compliance as well. 
As discussed above, research suggests that 
taxpayer compliance is at least partially built on 
trust in the government and taxpayers’ beliefs 
regarding the legitimacy of the government’s 
authority. If taxpayers believe that the reporting 
requirements are illegitimate or an unfair 
encroachment on their privacy, they could 
respond in kind by putting less effort into 
complying with their tax obligations.
Of course, different people think about 
privacy in different ways. Some think that privacy 
is dead, while others argue that privacy is even 
more important in today’s world. We cannot settle 
those debates here. What we can do here is 
suggest that privacy can be understood as a set of 
expectations regarding the flow of information in 
particular contexts.21 When those norms change — 
whether because of the disclosure of information 
to a new party, the disclosure of information in a 
new way, or a change in how information is 
protected — some may feel a loss of privacy.22 
Even when those feelings of privacy loss might be 
justified by society’s pursuit of other worthy 
causes (such as tax enforcement), that does not 
change the fact that some will experience the loss 
nonetheless.
Use tax notice and reporting statutes would 
seem to be strong examples of actions that harm 
privacy under that conception, whether they 
result in any legal privacy violation.23 An annual 
summary of purchasing activities provided to the 
state represents a significant change to the norms 
of information flow in the context of online 
commerce, and it is safe to suggest that at least 
some individuals will perceive privacy loss from 
such a report. States should thus consider the 
potential impact on taxpayers’ views regarding 
legitimacy and, correspondingly, on taxpayers’ 
motivations to voluntarily comply.24
To be clear, our concerns with notice and 
reporting statutes do not indicate that we think 
they are a bad idea.25 Instead, our analysis is 
meant to demonstrate how a quite sensible 
attempt to increase vendor compliance can create 
problems for individual compliance. That would 
not matter if individual compliance did not 
matter, but we have argued that it does. Thus, we 
conclude that any state considering the adoption 
of notice and reporting statutes should also 
consider improved consumer-focused 
compliance efforts.26 If states do not make use of 
the tools that notice and reporting statutes 
provide to improve consumer-focused 
compliance efforts, then it becomes much harder 
to justify the loss of privacy that will be felt by at 
least some individuals, and the resulting harm to 
the rule of law and to tax compliance.
21
Professor Helen Nissenbaum calls that “contextual integrity.” 
Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119 
(2004); see also Dan Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 90 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1087, 1127-28 (2002) (arguing that privacy is best understood in 
“specific contextual situations”).
22
Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context 141-47 (2010).
23
On balance, and depending on the details of the statute, we 
think those statutes can pass muster, but, again, that is not the key 
from a compliance perspective. For further discussion, see Scott W. 
Gaylord and Andrew J. Haile, “Constitutional Threats in the E-
Commerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce 
Clause Limits on Amazon Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes,” 
89 N.C. L. Rev. 2011 (2011).
24
As we noted in our prior article, that is increasingly important 
as taxing authorities attempt to catch up to a changing economy. 
See Thimmesch, Gamage, and Shanske, supra note 1, at 1052 (noting 
the challenges of the “gig economy” for tax compliance).
25
On that point, it would demonstrate a great deal of chutzpah 
for remote vendors to complain about notice and reporting statutes 
on the two grounds we articulate, as it is those vendors’ 
unwillingness to collect the use tax, even as it becomes ever easier 
and cheaper to do so, that has been the impetus for states to craft 
those statutes. As Paul Krugman has explained, “The traditional 
definition of chutzpah says it’s when you murder your parents, 
then plead for clemency because you’re an orphan,” see “Maestro of 
Chutzpah,” The New York Times, Mar. 2, 2004.
26
States should also consider finding ways to assuage privacy 
concerns.
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Conclusion
Through this article and our prior article in 
this series, we have built the case for a modified 
approach to the state use tax. Our proposed 
approach would take consumer compliance more 
seriously. To be sure, the task of improving 
consumer-based compliance may be difficult. Yet 
that task is worth undertaking. Efforts to improve 
consumer-based compliance would have 
economic benefits, would support the rule of law, 
and could promote voluntary compliance more 
generally. Overall, that is a project worth the 
candle, and our next article in this series will 
provide concrete examples of consumer-centric 
approaches that states could take that are backed 
by academic and field research. 
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